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Abstract
Monetary policy VARs typically presume stability of the long-run outcomes. We introduce the
possibility of switches in the long-run equilibrium in a cointegrated VAR by allowing both the co-
variance matrix and weighting matrix in the error-correction term to switch. We ﬁnd that monetary
policy alternates between sustaining long-run growth and disinﬂationary regimes. Allowing state
changes can also help explain the price puzzle and justify the use of commodity prices as a corrective
measure. Finally, we show that regime-switching has implications for disinﬂationary monetary policy
and can explain the variety of sacriﬁce ratio estimates that exist in the literature.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Changes in monetary policy can occur in either the implementation of policy (shocks) or the objectives
of policy (regimes). The former are typically modeled as vector innovations to a vector autoregression
(VAR) in which monetary policy is identiﬁed by structural restrictions on the contemporaneous impacts
of the variables (e.g., Sims 1992) or restrictions on the long-run eﬀects of shocks (e.g., Blanchard and
Quah 1989). This so-called structural VAR literature has identiﬁed a number of stylized facts resulting
from the implementation of monetary policy and has spawned a vast literature (see Bernanke and Mihov
1998; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999 for surveys).
More recently, switching monetary policy regimes have garnered some attention (Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler 2000; Dennis 2001; Hanson 2002a; Boivin and Gianonni 2002). Policy regimes involve switches
in the policy rule that reﬂect, for example, changes in the policymaker’s reaction to deviations from
the target inﬂation rate or output growth rate. These studies are aimed at ﬁnding persistent changes
in policy which result, for example, from changes in central bank leadership or transparency. These
regime changes can have a large eﬀect on the volatility of money, interest rates, and output. For
example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler show that a switch in the objectives of monetary policy post-1982
has resulted in a more stable, inﬂation-controlling policy. Dennis argues that a change in policymaker
preferences has shifted the post-1979 inﬂation target down from over 7 percent to under 2 percent.
Hanson examines whether a change in Fed policy was the cause of increased instability in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Boivin and Giannoni consider whether the Fed’s eﬀectiveness has changed in
the postwar period.
A new branch of literature has begun to simultaneously examine both regime changes and policy
shocks (see, for example, Bernanke and Mihov 1998; Owyang 2002; Sims and Zha 2002). These authors
show, among other things, that the stance of monetary policy is important not only to the policymaker’s
response to the exogenous economic shocks (e.g., the Taylor rule) but also to the contemporaneous eﬀects
of the monetary policy innovations (i.e., the monetary shock itself). What these papers do not address
are the long-run objectives and impacts of monetary p o l i c y . W ei n v e s t i g a t et h o se long-run impacts here.
Our long-run identiﬁcation is achieved through the long-run impact matrix of a vector error-correction
model (VECM). Short-run identiﬁcation is achieved by making standard assumptions of how monetary
policy impacts other economic variables of interest and by similar assumptions about the information
2set of the Fed.
Our approach incorporates regime switches in the long-run relationships through the weighting
matrix of the error-correction term. Gregory and Hansen (1996) also looked at regime switches in the
cointegrating vector but made no distinction between the weighting matrix and the long-run equilibrium
(see also Hall, Psaradakis, and Sola 1997; Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente 2003; Paap and van Dijk
2003 for recent papers using Markov switching in an error-correction framework). We ﬁnd it natural to
assume that the long-run relationships between the cointegrated variables remain the same across states
but that the weighting term is state-dependent. Modeling the weighting matrix as state-dependent
allows variables to respond diﬀerently to monetary policy shocks, even in the long run. This lends
itself to plausible economic interpretation and at the same time preserves the Engle and Granger (1987)
notion of cointegration.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief motivation for our approach. Section 3
presents a VECM for monetary policy, with Markov switching in the weighting matrix for long-run
impacts and regime-dependent heteroskedasticity, and outlines the estimation technique. Section 4
discusses the results of the estimation. Section 5 considers the implications of the switching model
in the context of the price puzzle. Section 6 examines the sacriﬁce ratio and the consequences for
disinﬂationary policy brought about by the presence of the switching process governing the weighting
matrix. Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivation
To motivate our approach, we brieﬂy present our empirical model—a more detailed version will be
presented below. Our model is the following VECM that allows for diﬀerent states of the economy:
∆yt = c +
k P
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + ΠStyt−1 + εt,
where St denotes the period-t state. In principle, we could allow part or all of the coeﬃcient matrix
to switch independently or with the error-correction term. However, we are interested in changes
in the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and, thus, restrict our attention to switching in the
error-correction term.
3This modeling approach partially overcomes the rational expectations critique of models of this
nature. The basic rational expectations argument is that in producing impulse responses, VAR (and
structural VAR) models look at responses to shocks that are outside the realm of such models. That is,
these models look at responses to shocks assumed not to have happened at the time of modeling. To
compound matters, these models further assume that the nonpolicy component of the economy is naive
about any change in policy that may have taken place—this is so because the coeﬃcient matrix in the
VAR is invariant to any switches in policy regime. Our approach does not suﬀer the same fate. We
not only allow the nature of the shock to vary across states through the state-dependency of the error
term, but we also allow individuals’ responses to the structural shocks identiﬁed to be state-dependent
by allowing for a diﬀerent coeﬃcient matrix in each of the states. This way individuals “correctly”
respond to monetary or any other shocks. Sims (1986) compares the rational expectations approach
and the VAR methodology when it comes to forecasting and policy analysis.
Our approach allows for a variety of interpretations regarding the response to monetary policy and
is not limited to changes that result only from switches in the policymaker’s decision rule. While we
will often, for the purposes of exposition, attribute changes in the “nonpolicy” response to switches in
the speed of adjustment of inﬂation expectations, we allow for alternative interpretations. Speciﬁcally,
changes in adjustment speed can result from sectoral shifts (Ramey and Shapiro 1998) or changes in
policymaker credibility (Faust and Svensson 1998).
3 Model and estimation
This section presents a more detailed version of our modeling approach along with our identiﬁcation
scheme. We adopt some of the more common assumptions used in the identiﬁcation of the impact matrix
of VAR monetary models. The result is a benchmark recursive model. Thus, long-run dynamics obtain
(solely) through the error-correction term, ΠSt, which includes both the regime-switching weighting
matrix, αSt, and the regime-invariant cointegrating vector, β. We combine both the short-run dynamics,
adopted from standard models in the monetary policy literature, and the aforementioned long-run
dynamics in a Markov-switching framework. This allows us to examine the state-dependent responses
to monetary policy shocks.
43.1 Model
Consider the following Markov-switching vector error-correction model (MSVECM):
∆yt = c +
k P
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + ΠStyt−1 + εt, (1)
where ∆yt =[ ∆y1t,∆y2t,...,∆ymt]0 is an m-dimensional vector of diﬀerenced variables of interest, c is
a vector of intercepts, the Γi’s are m × m parameter matrices, and ΣSt are state-dependent covariance
matrices. ΠSt are the state-dependent long-run impact matrices deﬁn e db yt h er × m matrix of
cointegrating vectors, β,a n dt h em × r state-dependent weighting matrix, αSt. Thus, we have
ΠSt = αStβ0.
We assume that St is a two-state ﬁrst-order Markov process in which St ∈ {0,1} is governed by the
transition kernel P,w h e r ePij =P r [ St = i|St−1 = j]. Rewrite the model (1) as
∆yt = c +
k P
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + αStβ0yt−1 + εt, (2)
where any switch in the cointegrating relationship is restricted to the weighting matrix, αSt.
The framework (1) can be readily expanded to incorporate switches in the intercept term or the
coeﬃcient matrices. We forgo analysis of switching in these components to focus on long-run dynamics.
(We considered simultaneous switching in the weighting matrix and the intercept term. We found that
including switching in the intercept term reduces the estimated number of periods in the transitory
state and prevents reasonable estimates of the model dynamics.)
Switching in ΠSt can be interpreted as switching in the cointegrating vectors, the weighting matrix,
or both. We note that these approaches are de facto equivalent. However, our interpretation of
switches in the error-correction term implies a single set of long-run relationships and preserves the
Engle-Granger notion of cointegration. In our framework, switches can be interpreted as diﬀerences in
the rate at which the long-run relationships obtain.
We propose that only allowing switches in the weighting matrix is not overly restrictive and provides
some further interpretation for our approach. The ﬁrst reason for conﬁning the nature of the switches is
computational convenience. We ﬁnd that the model becomes intractable if we allow all the coeﬃcients
5in the MSVECM to be state-dependent. Allowing for switching in more parameters also conﬁnes us
to models having fewer variables. We argue that such a sacriﬁce is not too great since additional
variables provide us with more dynamics that would otherwise be absent from a model allowing for
more switches but fewer variables. Second, if one were to map back to the reduced form of the model,
it would become apparent that diﬀerences between states arise through the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lag
of the data matrix (this is how the weighting matrix, αSt, can be state-dependent while Γi is not).
For lower-order systems this should prove not too restrictive, since A1, the lag-one coeﬃcient from the
reduced form of the model, would ﬁgure prominently in the error-correction term. The error-correction
term is I −
Pk
i=1 Ai from the structural model.
We oﬀer as further motivation some other potential interpretations of the form of the model. Our
preferred interpretation is that the long-run relationship between the variables, β0yt−1, is invariant to
the state of the economy; however, the weights given to each relationship, αSt, are state-dependent.
This implies that shocks to the system could potentially have diﬀerent long-run eﬀects across states,
through αSt, while maintaining any long-run relationship among the variables. For example, a shock to
monetary policy will have diﬀerent long-run eﬀects on, say, output growth, depending on whether the
Fed targeted inﬂation or output. There are two things at work here: the long-run response to shocks
and the cointegrated relationship. We can have the cointegrated relationship, β0yt−1, unchanged while
having diﬀerent long-run responses to shocks. This is due to the fact that the long-run response
coeﬃcient is ΠSt = αStβ0, which is a function of the switching elements (see Hamilton 1994, pp. 579-
581, for the long-run response matrix).
The nature of the impulse responses thus depends on the Fed’s preference at the time of the shock.
A second interpretation is that αSt could reﬂe c tt h er a t ea tw h i c hp e o p l el e a r nt h en a t u r eo ft h es h o c k
to the Fed’s policy rule. The slower the rate of learning, the greater the impact of shocks to the Fed’s
policy rule, implying more persistence in the impulse responses. The weighting coeﬃcient could also
be interpreted as indicating the amount of relative frictions that exist in each state. In states where
there are more frictions, the responses to monetary shocks will be curtailed.
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that αSt could capture the nature of nonpolicy instruments
across states. That is, we should expect diﬀerent responses to monetary policy if the mixture of non-
policy instruments changes. This latter interpretation is outside the realm of this paper, as it would
6require us to redeﬁne the number of states. That is, the states would be a mixture of both policy and
nonpolicy instruments resulting in spolicy∗snonpolicy states, instead of spolicy states. We ignore this latter
interpretation for now and treat all nonpolicy instruments as if they were one.
3.2 Estimation
The data are the monthly coincident indicators index, the personal consumption expenditure (PCE)
chain price index, and the federal funds rate from 1960:01 to 2003:08. Each of the ﬁrst two variables
are entered in log levels. The model (2) can be estimated using an iterative three-step Gibbs sampling
procedure (e.g., Krolzig 1996, 1997). First, we determine the number of cointegrating relationships
using Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue procedure. This two-step procedure is adopted from the work
of Saikkonen (1992) and Saikkonen and Luukkonen (1997) to obtain estimates of the cointegrating
vectors, β. They show that the Johansen procedure estimates consistent cointegrating vectors even in
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.
7Given (3), a matrix of cointegrating vectors β, and a series of states e ST =
½
S1,S 2, ···,S T
¾
,
we draw the parameter values from the posterior normal-inverted Wishart distribution with priors ν01,
ν02, N0, Z0, W01, and W02. The priors we use are uninformative. Alternative priors that could
take advantage of the Bayesian methodology might employ, for example, the Sims-Zha (1998) prior.
In that case, the prior accounts for possible (unestimated) cointegrating vectors. Since we employ
uninformative priors, we model the cointegrating vectors explicitly.
At each iteration, Φ, Σ1, and Σ2 can be drawn from a distribution with degrees of freedom ν,
precision matrix N, parameter means Z, and covariance matrices W1 and W2, deﬁned by
ν1 = ν01 + b T1,
ν2 = ν02 + b T2,
N = N0 + X0X,
Z = N−1
³






































where b T1 and b T2 are the number of periods in each state, b Z =( X0X)
−1 X0Y,a n db Σ =
³
Y − Xb Z
´0 ³
Y − Xb Z
´
.
The states e S =
½
S1,S 2, ···,S T
¾
can be drawn from the posterior distribution p(e ST|e yT,Φ,Σ1,Σ2),
which is conditional on the data e yT and the drawn parameters Φ, Σ1, and Σ2. The posteriors are ob-
tained from
p(St|e yt,Φ,Σ1,Σ2)=
f(yt|e yt−1,S t,Φ,Σ1,Σ2)p(St|e yt−1,Φ,Σ1,Σ2)
P
St







and p(St−1|e yt−1,Φ,Σ1,Σ2) is taken from each previous iteration (see Hamilton 1989 or Kim and Nelson
1999).
The transition probabilities, pij =P r [ St = i|St−1 = j], are also derived from the estimation al-
gorithm. Though we forgo formal discussion of their estimation, we note that they are drawn from
8posteriors formed from beta conjugate distributions.
To satisfy the Lucas critique, we require the state process to depend on the underlying stochastic
process, ε (e.g., see Hamilton 1995). We partially accomplish this in two ways. First, the posterior
distribution for the state process (5) is a function of the state-dependent variance-covariance matrix.
Second, the data used in the ﬁltering of the state process is the same data used in the estimation of the
state-dependent coeﬃcient matrices in the VECM.
3.3 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of the model implies two steps: identiﬁcation of the long-run relationships through the set
of cointegrating vectors and identiﬁcation of the short-run eﬀects through the contemporaneous impact
matrix. The former was discussed above. In a three-variable model, our short-run identiﬁcation
consists of a Cholesky ordering of the system with the variables ordered: output, prices, and federal
funds rate. This implies the monetary authority takes both output and prices into consideration when
setting policy but that policy does not impact output and prices contemporaneously.
We utilize the recursive form of identiﬁcation in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the results
using our methodology with the most basic form of identiﬁcation. More complicated forms of identi-
ﬁcation came about because simpler identifying assumptions could not deliver impulse responses that
were consistent, or considered consistent, with monetary policy. Our aim is to see how much mileage
we get from our methodology with as few structural assumptions as possible.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we examine monetary shocks in a three-variable cointegrated extension of common VAR
models, which account for, among other factors, the changes in inﬂation expectations. We impose
a two-state restriction on the underlying Markov process for tractability. While we recognize this is
limiting, we believe it is illustrative of how a model of this nature can partially characterize a solution to
the rational expectations critique. As a test, we estimated a three-state model. Under our speciﬁcation,
the ﬁlter did not identify enough periods in the third state to estimate that state’s parameters with any
conﬁdence. We therefore leave higher-order Markov models for future research.
94.1 States
The state process is shown in Figure 1, where the probability that the economy is in state 2 is indicated
on the y axis. This regime could be interpreted as a high inﬂation target or high inﬂation expectations
regime. This ﬁgure corresponds to the posterior probabilities governing the weighting matrix in the
error-correction term and shows that this cointegration relationship undergoes ﬁve signiﬁcant periods
of change. The timing of switches to the high inﬂation expectations state tends to be correlated with
events such as oil shocks and recessions, although not exclusively so. For example, the 1973-75 recession
and the Volcker disinﬂation are clearly identiﬁed by the underlying state process.
The majority of the turning points are related to events coincident with large increases in prices.
These include the CPI reaching a new peak in 1960, the devaluation of the dollar and a spike in
inﬂation in early 1969, and a farm recession and oil price shock in the mid-1980s. These posterior state
probabilities are consistent with the ﬁndings of other monetary policy models (Owyang 2002; Sims and
Zha 2002) and recession-dating models (Hamilton 1989).
Figure 1 about here
Table 1 about here
Table 1 shows that there are two long-run relationships, with cointegrating vectors β1 and β2,t h a t
are ﬁxed across regimes; it also provides the weighting matrices for these relationships that vary across
r e g i m e s .T h ea b s o l u t es i z eo ft h ew e i g h t si sg r e a t e rin state 1 compared with state 2, implying the rate of
convergence (or rate of learning) diﬀers across states. Moreover, the nature of the long-run response—or
to be more precise, the transition to the long-run equilibrium—associated with the ﬁrst cointegrating
relationship diﬀers across states. Finally, Table 1 provides estimates of the transition probabilities for
each state. We note, in particular, that each state, characterized by transition probabilities below 0.1,
is relatively persistent.
104.2 Transition Dynamics
To evaluate the eﬀect of a change in state, we conduct the counterfactual state-switching experiments to
demonstrate the model’s transition dynamics. These switches might be viewed as either the economy’s
assimilation of a change in the Taylor rule (e.g., Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000) or the inﬂation objective
(e.g., Dennis 2001). We initialize the model with 1978 data and set the state to 1. We then switch
to state 2 and observe the transition dynamics in the absence of shocks. After 24 periods, we switch
the regime back to state 1. This exercise (experiment A) is shown as the solid line in Figure 2. This
contrasts with the model remaining in state 1 for all time (experiment B), the dashed line in Figure
2. Although the recession in A is deeper, the policymaker is able to lower prices without exogenous
monetary shocks. Moreover, in A, the Fed’s policy appears more anti-inﬂationary at the outset and,
thus, produces a steeper recession and more rapid disinﬂation. Since this outcome is produced in the
absence of monetary shocks, there are a limited number of interpretations that can explain the results.
Changes in Fed preferences or changes in the inﬂation target can explain the switch in the expected
path of the funds rate.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
A second set of experiments demonstrates the eﬀect of remaining in state 2 for all time. Figure
3 shows the results of these experiments—the solid li n ei n d i c a t i n gt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h el o n g - r u nr e l a -
tionship switches to state 1 after 24 periods (experiment C), and the dashed line representing the path
governed by state 2 for all time (experiment D). This set of experiments further veriﬁes the nature of
the long-run relationships in this model. State 2 represents an upward trend in both prices and output
as well as a sustained expansionary monetary policy exhibited by an ever-decreasing funds rate. We
can interpret the inﬂation regime (state 2) as one in which the Fed has either established a new, higher
inﬂation target or is sacriﬁcing price stability in order to increase growth. Further, we can interpret the
growth regime (state 1) as the Fed adopting either sustained inﬂation-neutral or actively contractionary
monetary policy under low inﬂation expectations.
11While, in the preceding experiments, it may appear that the regimes are simply manifestations of
contractionary and expansionary policy shocks, we reiterate that the state changes reﬂect changes in
the stance of policy. The idea of a sustained policy stance is important to our interpretation. These
regimes are not supported by contractionary or expansionary shocks, but by a revision of preferences
or expectations. We explore the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks in the next subsection.
4.3 Responses to Policy Shocks
Consider the short-run response to a one-standard-deviation shock to the federal funds rate. These
impulse responses are generated conditional on the state—that is, we assume that if the shock is generated
in state 1, it is transmitted through state 1. Although we acknowledge this is a restriction, the state-
dependent impulse responses and the state transition experiments are suﬃcient to describe the majority
of the model’s short-run dynamics.
Figure 4 about here
The eﬀect of a contractionary monetary policy shock (a 100-basis-point increase in the federal funds
rate) is shown in Figure 4. In state 1, the contractionary shock has the anticipated eﬀect on output—the
increase in the funds rate induces a recession. The eﬀect on output is relatively weak. The recession
is deﬂationary, causing a reduction in prices over the four-year period.
The contractionary monetary shock in state 2 keeps the funds rate strictly positive for one year.
Contrary to state 1, the central tendency is to fully reverse the shock after approximately 30 months.
Also in state 2, output is bolstered by the policy reversal and rises (weakly) over 48 months. This
causes prices to continue to rise; the policy shock stems inﬂation for the ﬁrst few years but the reversal
allows prices to continue to increase.
5T h e P r i c e P u z z l e
Originally identiﬁed by Sims (1992), VAR studies of monetary policy have shown that a contractionary
shock to the federal funds rate results in a temporary (often lasting a year or more) increase in the
aggregate price level. This “price puzzle” has remained a question mark in the identiﬁcation of monetary
12policy shocks, as most researchers believe that identiﬁcations that exhibit the phenomenon are incorrect.
Sims recognized that including a commodity price index (PCOM) in the estimation eliminates the
increase in prices associated with a contractionary monetary shock. Hanson (2002b), however, argues
that the addition of PCOM to solve the price puzzle is ad hoc and theoretically unappealing.
Proponents of including PCOM might argue that they capture inﬂation expectations. Our approach
is to model inﬂationary expectations (or at least take them into account) by allowing both shocks (au-
thority side) and responses (agents side) to change accordingly. Modeling the VAR this way allows
inﬂationary expectations to vary across states. Thus, we do not need PCOM to reﬂect expectations.
Since we model both the monetary authority’s and respondents’ expectations, we have a more the-
oretically interpretable explanation. In a recent paper, Owyang and Ramey (2004) discovered that
switches from an inﬂation-hawk policy regime to a dove policy regime can lead to the hump-shaped
price response that characterizes the price puzzle. We conjecture that the price puzzle may, in fact,
stem from the standard VAR’s inability to eﬀectively model these types of switches.
Figure 5 about here
We also contend that commodity prices model inﬂation expectations corresponding to Fed policy. To
illustrate this point, we plot the detrended industrial commodity price index against the state-switching
process (results were similar when using the Dow Jones commodity price index for a smaller sample).
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 shows that the majority of the state switches coincide with (or predate)
major commodity price changes in either direction. For example, the switch in the early 70s coincides
with a fall in commodity prices, whereas the switch in the early 80s coincides with a rise in prices. The
correlation between the state-switching process and the detrended PCOM is 0.34. We view this as
signiﬁcant, given that we restricted our model to only two states of nature and also recognize that not
every (major) price change necessarily implies a new state. That is, price changes could also be due
to, say, demand factors and are not necessarily limited to policy actions. The second panel of Figure
5 plots the absolute value of the detrended price series against the state-switching process to highlight
the fact that switches in states invariably coincide with major price movements.
The conclusion we draw from this simple exercise is that including PCOM in structural VARs
was appropriate because they proxy for policy-related changes in inﬂationary expectations. However,
13including PCOM does not lead to an obvious economic interpretation. The problem remains that
responses to monetary policy vary depending on the goals of the Fed and how quickly such goals are
realized by respondents. That is, traditional VARs provide us with only one response for, say, inﬂation,
even though there are as many responses as there are states (as in the MSVECM framework). It comes
as no surprise to us that PCOM plays such a role since, in our opinion, they are the most responsive,
and thus the most likely, candidates to reﬂect the state process. Therefore, considering monetary policy
in a state-switching framework resolves the price puzzle without the inclusion of a commodity price
index and, at the same time, provides impulse responses that are more accurate representations of the
nature of policy and the goals of the Fed.
6 The Cost of Disinﬂation
A number of studies have used structural models to assess the output or employment loss caused
by disinﬂationary monetary policy (for example, see Okun 1978; Fuhrer 1994, 1995; Cecchetti and
Rich 2001). These studies have constructed “sacriﬁce ratios” that measure the cumulative increase
in unemployment or loss of output associated with each percentage point of policy-induced inﬂation
reduction. In particular, there is a rough consensus that a 1 percent reduction in inﬂation increases
cumulative unemployment by about 2 percentage points per year. Cecchetti and Rich (2001) found
sacriﬁce ratios in terms of output loss, over a two-year horizon, ranging from 0.62 to 3.71 using three
structural VARs of monetary policy. Recently, Filardo (1998) concluded that the sacriﬁce ratio varied
across diﬀerent regimes. He interpreted these regimes as growth states in which monetary policy
produced diﬀerent eﬀects.
To calculate the sacriﬁce ratio, we can assess the output cost of a temporary disinﬂationary monetary
shock within a single regime. Our model has the additional advantage that we can measure the cost of
disinﬂation occurring as a result of switches between regimes. This also allows us to reconcile a number
of diﬀerent, seemingly contrary, facts derived from the literature. First, our model supports multiple
“within-regime” sacriﬁce ratios, which may explain the diﬀerent numbers others have estimated using
structural models with alternative assumptions. This is also consistent with Fuhrer’s (1994, 1995) and
Filardo’s (1998) claims of multiple structural breaks in sacriﬁce ratio estimation. Further, our model
reconciles, in an intuitive manner, a low estimated sacriﬁce ratio without forfeiting the high-output-loss
14recessions that were seemingly driven by the Volcker disinﬂation (see Owyang and Ramey 2004).
We posit two distinct disinﬂationary episodes: one driven by a policy shock and one driven by
a change in regime. If the state truly is a reﬂection of the underlying inﬂation expectations, the
diﬀerence in the two disinﬂationary forces is apparent. Within regime, the policymaker disinﬂates
under ﬁxed inﬂation expectations. Fixed expectations build in inﬂation persistence and, as a result,
the disinﬂation is costly. Across regimes, the policymaker has the beneﬁt of shifting expectations,
which can, in and of themselves, assist disinﬂation. Lower expectations can support a lower inﬂation
rate, and the disinﬂa t i o ni sl e s sc o s t l y .
Table 3 contains the estimated disinﬂation costs both within-regime and across states. These
disinﬂationary losses exclude the eﬀects of disinﬂationary price shocks, which can confound the analysis
of the eﬀects of policy. Within-regime sacriﬁce ratios of 2.16 and 3.60 cumulative percent output lost
per percentage point inﬂation reduced in states 1 and 2, respectively, are consistent with estimates from
the aforementioned studies. Moreover, the disinﬂation costs associated with a switch from state 2 to
state 1 are even smaller—1.19 percent output growth lost per percentage point of inﬂation reduced per
year.
The policy implications of the above analysis remain ambiguous, depending on the policymaker’s
belief about his eﬀect on the underlying state. In the model, the state follows a Markov process;
a natural extension is to assume that the regime follows from a credible switch to a price-stability
objective. When the objective is credible, inﬂation expectations become more downwardly ﬂexible and
disinﬂationary policy can be conducted at a lower cost. However, in practice, a change in inﬂation
expectations may not be easily accomplished (e.g., the change in expectations following the Volcker
disinﬂation may have occurred only after a number of contractionary monetary shocks at a high output
cost).
7C o n c l u s i o n
We examine monetary policy shocks in a Markov-switching vector error-correction (MSVECM) frame-
work, in which the long-run responses to such shocks (and any other shock for that matter) can vary
across states. Long-run variation is achieved by allowing switches in the weighting matrix of the error-
correction term, while leaving the cointegrating relationship between variables intact. We suggest that
15such an approach to monetary policy is theoretically appealing and goes to the heart of the rational
expectations critique of models of this nature.
In particular, we ﬁnd that a contractionary monetary shock generates diﬀerent impulses in each
state. The nature of the impulse responses is suggestive of the presence of two (unique) types of
states, one a growth state and the other a state in which the policymaker cannot credibly commit to
low inﬂation. In the former state, a contractionary shock to monetary policy leads to the usual fall in
output and an eventual fall in prices. However, in the latter state the contractionary shock is quickly
reversed, resulting in a persistent rise in prices and output.
One implication of our methodology is the absence of the price puzzle commonly found in monetary
VAR models. This we accomplished without the need to include a commodity price index in the VAR.
We oﬀer as explanation that our state process directly captures inﬂationary expectations, the role
hitherto played by PCOM in previous (one-state) speciﬁcations.
Our model also has implications for examining disinﬂationary monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, our
model allows us to interpret the cost of disinﬂation in the context of both contractionary shocks to
policy and changes in the stance of policy. We ﬁnd that although the contractionary shocks produce
within-regime sacriﬁce ratios consistent with the existing literature, regime changes can reduce the
inﬂation rate at a lower cost.
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19Table 1: Estimation Results 
      Y P R 
cointegrating  β1
b




0.3584 -0.1958 0.2755 
       
 0.0067  0.1044  -0.2729 
  α1(St = 1)  (0.037) (0.062) (0.217) 
  -0.022 -0.0971 0.4275 
weighting 
α1(St = 2)  (0.041) (0.069) (0.244) 
matrices
d -0.0002 -0.0441 0.1101 
 
α2(St = 1)  (0.043) (0.068) (0.227) 
  -0.0161 -0.0267  0.099 
 
α2(St = 2)  (0.042) (0.069) (0.239) 
       
transition  Pr [St = 1 | St-1 = 2]    0.0218   
probabilities  Pr [St = 2 | St-1 = 1]     0.0874    
     a unnormalized cointegrating vectors from Johansen's max eigenvalue procedure 
     b null of no cointegrating vector rejected at 5% 
     c null of only one cointegrating vector rejected at 5% 
     d 60% coverage intervals in parentheses 
 
  
Table 2: Costs of Disinflation 
   Sacrifice Ratio* 
Within State 1  2.16 
Within State 2  3.6 
From State 1 to State 2  1.33 
From State 2 to State 1  1.19 
     * percent growth lost per percentage point inflation 










































































































































Figure 1.  State 2 Posterior Probabilities: Smoothed Probabilities,                        





































































































































































































































































































































  Figure 2.  State Transition Experiments 1: Experiment A (switches from State 2 to 








































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  State Transition Experiments 2: Experiment C (switches from State 2 to 
State 1 in January 1981, solid line); Experiment D (remains in State 2 for all time, dotted 
line). 
       
 
       
 
































































































    


















    
     
  Figure 4.  Impulse Responses: 60% coverage intervals are shown. 
 
  


































































































































































































































  Figure 5. Graphs plotting the posterior probability of State 2 against a) (linear) 
detrended commodity prices (bold line) with Correlation = 0.34, and b) the absolute 
movements in commodities prices around its trend (bold line), with Correlation = 0.14.  
Commodities prices are taken from the Journal of Commerce’s industrial price index.     
 